

DRIVE IT LIKEDEFCON 23 [2015]YOUHACKEDITDEFCON 23 [2015]Mathematical StructureMathematical StructureMathematical StructureMathematical StructureHow structureMathematical StructureMathematical

Security Researcher





Combo Breaker







ProxyGambit



MySpace Worm evercookie OwnStar pwnat OpenSesame USBdriveby

Other Works

- * Charlie Miller & Chris Valasek
- 2010: UCSD/UW Research
 (CD player, Bluetooth, etc)
- Relay Attacks (Amplification) on PKES
- * Tesla talk later today!
- Cryptographic attacks on KeeLoq
- HiTag2 Immobilizer Disabling
- * OpenGarages
- * iamthecavalry
- * Lots of others...





Thanks EFF!















http://fcc.io/qvq-qnrs283

→ C http://fcc.io/qvq-qnrs283

8 Matches found for FCC ID QVQ-QNRS283

View	<u>Exhibit Type</u>	Date Submitted to	<u>Display</u>	I
Attachment		FCC	<u>Type</u>	Į
Cover letter	Cover Letter(s)	11/29/2014	pdf	1
Cover letter	Cover Letter(s)	11/29/2014	pdf	:
<u>External</u>	External Photos	11/29/2014	pdf	1
pnotos				
<u>Label</u>	ID Label/Location Info	11/29/2014	pdf	:
<u>Internal</u> photos	Internal Photos	11/29/2014	pdf	1
Test report	Test Report	11/29/2014	pdf	:
Test setup	Test Setup Photos	11/29/2014	pdf	1
User manual	Users Manual	11/29/2014	pdf	:



use fcc.io, thanks Dominic Spill!



1 results were found that match the search criteria:

Grantee Code: qvq Product Code: -qnrs283

Displaying records 1 through 1 of 1.

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)	<u>Detail</u> Summary	E.		Qinuo Electronics Co., Ltd	3/F, Bldg.A, Yucheng Base, Keji Rd., High- tech Industrial Park, Fengze, Quanzhou, Fujian	Quanzhou	N/A	China	362000	QVQ- QNRS283	Original Equipment	11/29/20	4390.0	390.0
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OET Exhibits List

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Cover letter	Cover Letter(s)	11/29/2014	pdf	11/29/2014
External photos	External Photos	11/29/2014	pdf	11/29/2014
<u>Label</u>	ID Label/Location Info	11/29/2014	pdf	11/29/2014
Internal photos	Internal Photos	11/29/2014	pdf	11/29/2014
Test report	Test Report	11/29/2014	pdf	11/29/2014
Test setup	Test Setup Photos	11/29/2014	pdf	11/29/2014
User manual	Users Manual	11/29/2014	pdf	11/29/2014

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Ederal Communications Commission [US] https

Operation Frequency	: 390 MHz
Channel number	: 1
Modulation type	: ASK

Power Supply

: DC 3V Supply 1

Applicant

Address

 $\leftarrow \rightarrow$

C

Manufacturer Address Qinuo Electroni
3/F, Bldg. A, Yi
Fengze, Quanzh

Qinuo Electroni
3/F, Bldg. A, Yi
Fengze, Quanzh





1 MHz - 6 GHz half-duplex transceiver raw I/Q samples open source software / hardware GNU Radio, SDR#, more dope as shit

HackRFOne from Michael Ossmann

Replay Attack w/HackRF

- * hackrf_transfer -r 390_data.raw -f 390000000 # listen
- * hackrf_transfer -t 390_data.raw -f 390000000 # transmit
- * # profit
- Don't need baud rate
- Don't need modulation / demodulation
- * Can be within 20MHz
- Can act as a "raw" code grabber/replayer...but it's more interesting than that.

RTL-SDR

24 - 1766 MHz raw I/Q samples RX only RTL2832U





GNU Radio (the stick shift of SDR)



Something happened

Something happened



SDR#

Works on Windows Sorta kinda on OS X



rtl_fm

terminal based quick and easy demodulates



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Label	ID Label/Location I	info 11/29/2014	pdf	11/29/2014
Internal pho	otos Internal Photos	11/29/2014	pdf	11/29/2014
Test report	Test Report	11/29/2014	pdf	11/29/2014
Test setup	Test Setup Photos	11/29/2014	pdf	11/29/2014
User manua	Users Manual	11/29/2014	pdf	11/29/2014

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Modulation Schemes



Fixed Code Garages

8 - 12 bit code
~2ms per bit + ~2ms delay
5 signals per transmission

(((2 ** 12)*12) + ((2 ** 11)*11) + ((2 ** 10)*10) + ((2 ** 9)*9) + ((2 ** 8)*8)) = 88576 bits88576 bits * (2ms signal + 2ms delay) * 5 transmissions = 1771520ms = 1771secs =

29.5 minutes







$354.2 \sec / 2 = 177 \sec = 3 \min 354.2 = 177 \sec = 3 \min 354.2 \sec = 3 \min 354.2 = 177 \tan 354.2 = 1777 \tan 354.2 = 17777 \tan 354.2 = 17777 \tan 354.2 = 17777$

Thanks Mike Ryan! Saturday, 3pm, Track Two Hacking Electric Skateboards Mike Ryan & Richo Healey





Where does one code end and the other begin?

Bit shift register?

Bit Shift Register

Code only clears one bit at a time while pulling in next bit

A 13 bit code tests two different 12 bit codes! 100000000001 10000000000 **1**0000000000



De Bruijn Sequence

00110 (5 bits) tests all 4 different 2-bit sequences instead of 8 bits total

Alphabet: {0, 1} Subsequence length: 2

Subsequences:

De Bruijn sequence:

{1, 0}-

 $\{1, 1\}$

{0, 0}-

-{0, 1}

Brute forcing a 3-bit code

1 bit 10 bits 20 bits 30 bits 40 bits 50 bits bit 0123456789**0**123456789**0**123456789**0**123456789**0**

000---001---010---101---011---110---100--- <--48 bits

OpenSesame Attack

First, remove the wait periods (reduces 50%):

1 bit10 bits20 bits30 bits40 bits50 bitsbit012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

00000101010101111110100 <-- 24 bits

By overlapping (De Bruijn), we reduce another ~62%: 000 011 001 111 010 110 101 100 0001011100 <-- 10 bits!

De Bruijn Sequence

For every 8 to 12 bit garage code

((2 ** 12) + 11) * 4ms / 2 = 8214ms = **8.214 seconds** Alphabet: {0, 1} Subsequence length: 2

Subsequences:

De Bruijn sequence:

 $\{1, 0\}$ -

 $\{1, 1\}$

 $\{0, 0\}$ -

 $-\{0, 1\}$



Yard Stick One

by Michael Ossmann TI CC1111 chipset rfcat by atlas Friday, 5pm, Track Two Fun with Symboliks Research Mode: enjoy the raw power of rflib

currently your environment has an object cal you interact with the rfcat dongle: drew g i \rightarrow d.ping() jules g >>> d.setFreq(433000000) >>> d.setMdmModulation(MOD_ASK_00K) >>> d.makePktFLEN(250) 11101110 >>> d.RFxmit("HALLO") [292].1/ >>> d.RFrecv() >>> print d.reprRadioConfig() es">\$97.00< src/Fi ="map-text">For a better price, Add to src/Fi src/Fi InnEl:b siness dayInnEl:b siness day

#ImAnEngineer



At the local hacker space, Barbie has been working with Evelina where they've developed firmware for their favorite Mattel toy, the IM-ME, to perform RF jamming, automated sniffing, demodulation, and replay attacks on ISM bands under 1GHz.





Mattel IM-ME

TI CC1101 chipset sub-GHz transceiver screen, backlight, keyboard, stylish Previously hacked by: Dave Michael Ossmann Travis Goodspeed Hacker Barbie



GoodFET by Travis Goodspeed

open source JTAG adapter / universal serial bus interface

OpenSesame



based off of Michael Ossmann's opensesame ASK transmitter <u>https://github.com/mossmann/im-me/tree/master/garage</u>



| Listed in category: Toys & Hobbies > Radio Control & Control Line > Radio Control Vehicles > Ca



Radica IM Me Wireless Handh 1 viewed per hour Item condition: New Quantity: 3 availa 1 Price: US \$909.83 5 watching Hassle-fre Free delivery in 4 days

Lessons

- Don't use a ridiculously small key space (duh)
- Require a preamble/sync word for beginning of each key
- * Use rolling codes...











https://api.gm.com/api/v1/oauth/token POST /api/v1/oauth/token HTTP/1.1 Host: api.gm.com^{Se} 2013-volt Content-Type: text/plain Connection: keep-alive Proxy-Connection: keep-alive FCAT dongle Accept: application/json Accept: dongle. User-Agent: RemoteLink/1022 CFNetwork/711.1.16 Darwin/14.0.0 Accept-Language: en donale Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate dongle.'.) dongle.'.) Content-Length: 422 eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1MiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJwYXNzd29yZCI6InRlc3RwYXNzIiwiZGV 2aWN1X21kIjoiMDdBNTE2NkItNjE4Mi00NTBGLUJCMTQtQzY0MkU5MkZFMkVCIiwic2NvcGU iOiJwcml2IG1zc28iLCJncmFudF90eXBlIjoicGFzc3dvcmQiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6InRlc3R

1c2VyIiwidGltZXN0YW1wIjoiMjAxNS0wNy0yNFQyMzox0DoxNy43NzlaIiwiY2xpZW50X2l
kIjoiUkxfaU9TLWk30F8yMDMiLCJub25jZSI6IjM3Qzg5Q0E4LTM5RUUtNDM2NS1CQjA3LUU
zQzU1REUyNUIyMyJ9.3C0rc8RUuHwQBDylnswoSPDE9QeUfvDZEJjstjXkzko=

param2

RemoteLink Login

{ "typ": "JWS", "alq": "HS256" } { "password": "testpass" "device id": "07A5166B-6182-450F-BB14-C642E92FE2EB", "scope": "priv msso", "grant_type": "password", "username": "testuser". "timestamp": "2015-07-24T23:18:17.779Z", "client id": "RL iOS-i78 203", "nonce": "37C89CA8-39EE-4365-BB07-E3C55DE25B23" 00000000 dc 2d 2b 73 c4 54 b8 7c 10 04 3c a5 9e cc 28 48 00000010 f0 c4 f5 07 94 7e f0 d9 10 98 ec b6 35

RemoteLinkLogin (base64 decoded)

SSL MITMA

- * Raspberry Pi
- * FONA GSM board
- mallory (SSL MITMA)
- * dns spoofing (<u>api.gm.com</u>)
- * iptables
- * Alfa AWUS036h
- * Edimax Wifi dongle
- * pre-paid SIM card



Create Network... Open Network Preferences...

3 11:34:37 00:23:76:ta:43:89 tt:tt:tt:tt:tt:tt 4 11:34:37 00:23:76:fa:43:89 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	IEEE 802.11 P IEEE 802.11 P	robe Request, robe Request,	SN=31, FN=0 SN=32, FN=0
6 11:34:40 00:23:76:fa:43:89 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	IEEE 802.11 P	robe Request, robe Request,	SN=109, FN= SN=110, FN=
⊞ Frame 5 (84 bytes on wire, 84 bytes captured)			
🗄 Radiotap Header 11, 11 oth 20			
IEEE 802.11 Probe Request, Flags:C			
🗆 IEEE 802.11 w. less is management frame			
🗆 Tagged parameters (36 bytes)			
🖃 SSID parameter set			
Tag Number: 0 (SSID parameter set)			
Tag length: 7			
Tag interpretation: Taddong "Taddong"			
⊞ Supported Rates: 1,0 2,0 5,5 11,			
	24,0 36,0 48,0) 54,0	
, 10000 00 00 14 00 ee 18 00 00 10 02 7b 09 a0 00 d	c 9c	Ţ	
0010 05 00 00 40 40 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff o	023@@	#	
0020 76 fa 43 89 ff ff ff ff ff ff d0 06 00 07 5	4 61 v.c	Ta	

802.11 Probe Requests

WINStar

n

3-162HE

012 npn-501203540

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Lessons

Validate certificates from CA

Press Release issued on 19 April 2010 Hongkong Post Certification Authority's root certificate included in Mozilla Firefox web browser

- Better yet, use certificate pinning and ignore
 CAs altogether
- Hash password with random salt on authentication (challenge-response)
- Always assume you're on a hostile network

Key Fobs & Rolling Codes

NM95HS01/NM95HS02 HiSeC™ High Security Rolling Code Generator

National Semiconductor "High Security Rolling Code" chip

Thanks Michael Ossmann for helping decipher this!

Rolling Codes

- * PRNG in key and car
- Synced seed + counter
- * Hit button, key sends code
- Hit button again, key sends next code
- If Eve replays the code, car rejects it because already used
- Should be difficult to predict
- Prevents replay attacks

Replaying Rolling Codes

- Capture signal while remote out of range from vehicle/garage
- * Replay later
- This is lame since we have to have access to the key, and it has to be far from the car

We're Jammin

Jam + Listen, Replay

- * Jam at slightly deviated frequency
- Receive at frequency with tight receive filter bandwidth to evade jamming
- User presses key but car can't read signal due to jamming
- Once we have code, we stop jamming and can replay
- But...once user does get a keypress in, new code invalidates our code!

Jam+Listen(1), Jam+Listen(2), Replay (1)

- * Jam at slightly deviated frequency
- Receive at frequency with tight receive filter bandwidth to evade jamming
- User presses key but car can't read signal due to jamming
- User presses key again you now have two rolling codes
- Replay first code so user gets into car, we still have second code

0/11 bits	0/8 bits	0/20/24 bits	4 bits	24/36 bits	0/8 bits	1 bit			
Preamble	Sync Field	Key ID Field	Data Field	Dynamic Code	Parity Field	Stop Bit			
FIGURE 4. Normal Data Frame Configuration									

The primary use of the data field is to indicate which key switch has been pressed. Since each key switch input can be associated with a particular application, the decoder can determine which function to initiate.

DYNAMIC CODE FIELD

The dynamic code field is transmitted with every frame, and its length is programmable. If DynSize = 0, a 24-bit field is sent; if DynSize = 1, a 36-bit field is sent. Its function is to provide a secure dynamic code which changes with each new transmission. The field is the result of combining the Protocol Abuse

National Semiconductor "High Security Rolling Code" chip

Thanks Michael Ossmann for helping decipher this!

Lessons

- Encrypt/hash the button/action
- * HMAC to prevent bit flipping if encrypted
- Use time-based algorithm (e.g. RSA SecurID
 [20 years old], "Dual KeeLoq" does this as of 2014)
- OR challenge / response via transceivers instead of one-way communication
- * Many vehicles have keys that RX+TX yet the remote unlock signal is still one-way and not timing based

Thank You!!!

YOU! EFF Michael Ossmann Travis Goodspeed Andy Greenberg atlas of d00m

My mom Defcon TI #hackrf #ubertooth Charlie Miller Chris Valasek Mike Ryan Andrew Crocker Nate Cardozo Kurt Opsahl

@SamyKamkar <u>http://samy.pl</u>
 <u>http://samy.pl/youtube</u>