

# Preventing Man-in-the-Middle Attacks with Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange and Authentication

$h$  = hash(plaintext, salt)       $e$  = encrypt(plaintext, key)       $d$  = decrypt(ciphertext, key)

## MAN IN THE MIDDLE ATTACK ON STANDARD AUTHENTICATION METHOD

### Alice

password = 54321  
key = zzz

$e(\text{password}, \text{key}) = \text{passhash}$   
 $e(54321, \text{zzz}) = \text{"deadbeef"}$   
SEND: "deadbeef"

### Mallory

alice key = zzz (DH MITMA)  
bob key = yyy (DH MITMA)

$d(\text{deadbeef}, \text{zzz}) = 54321$   
 $e(54321, \text{yyy}) = \text{"badcoded"}$   
SEND->Bob: "badcoded"

### Bob

password = 54321  
key = yyy

$e(\text{password}, \text{key}) = \text{passhash}$   
 $e(54321, \text{yyy}) = \text{"badcoded"}$

**RECV: "badcoded" matches**

**MITMA successful :(**

## NEW AUTHENTICATION METHOD

### Alice

password = 54321  
key = zzz

$h(54321, \text{key}) = \text{"blahwoot"}$   
SEND: "blahwoot"

$h(\text{ok}, \text{password}) = \text{GOOD!}$   
 $h(\text{"ok"}, 54321) = \text{"awesome"}$

**RECV: "awesome" matches**

pubkey now saved for future use in known\_hosts

**DH + authentication verified**

### Bob

password = 54321  
key = zzz

$h(54321, \text{key}) = \text{"blahwoot"}$

**RECV: "blahwoot" matches**

$h(\text{ok}, \text{password}) = \text{GOOD!}$   
 $h(\text{"ok"}, 54321) = \text{"awesome"}$   
SEND: "awesome"

## MAN IN THE MIDDLE ATTACK ON NEW METHOD

### Alice

password = 54321  
key = zzz

$h(\text{password}, \text{key}) = \text{passhash}$   
 $h(54321, \text{zzz}) = \text{"blahwoot"}$   
SEND: "blahwoot"

**RECV: BAD!**

pubkey NOT saved in known\_hosts

### Mallory

alice key = zzz (DH MITMA)  
bob key = yyy (DH MITMA)

can't reverse hash to get pass!  
can't send  $h(\text{ok}, \text{password})$   
doesn't know password

**both sides fail authentication**

### Bob

password = 54321  
key = yyy

$h(\text{password}, \text{key}) = \text{passhash}$   
 $h(54321, \text{yyy}) = \text{"wtfmate"}$

RECV: "blahwoot" != "wtfmate"

**SEND: BAD!**